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ALL BARK AND NO BITE: HOW 
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING CAN SOLVE 
CHINA’S POOR ENFORCEMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
tarting in the late 1970s, China began a dramatic trans-
formation of its labor system from one of guaranteed em-
ployment to one based on contract labor.1 In response to this 
ongoing process of systematic change and the emergence of an 
enormous population of new laborers,2 China has found itself in 
the challenging position of structuring an employment system 
that spurs economic growth without sacrificing employee rights 
and benefits. To address this issue, China has implemented a 
wave of employment regulations aimed at guaranteeing certain 
basic rights for workers. Starting with the Labor Law of 1995,3 
the Labor Contract Law of 20084 (“LCL”), the 2013 Amend-
ments to the Labor Contract Law,5 and the proposed Draft La-
bor Dispatch Regulations, 6  China has created a substantial 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Susan Leung, China’s Labor Contract System from Planned to Market 
Economy, 3 J. L. ETHICS & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1-2 (2012). 
 2. LOREN BRANDT & THOMAS G. RAWSKI, CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION 1 (2008). 
 3. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa (中华人民共和国劳动法) 
[Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), translation 
available at http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=56&aid=31. 
 4. Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), translation available at 
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/labor/labor-
contract-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html [hereinafter Labor Con-
tract Law]. 
 5. See Jeanette Yu, Newly Amended PRC Labor Contract Law Imposing 
Stricter Control Over the Use of Seconded Employees, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eec02e59-c329-4c77-
aafb-4b4c19324c95. 
 6. See Jeffrey Wilson, Comments on Draft Labor Dispatch Regulations 
Due by September 7, INT’L LAB. & EMP’T L. COMM. NEWSL., Aug. 2013, availa-
ble at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/int_newslet
ter/2013/aug2013/china.html. 
S
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foundation of mandated employment rights for Chinese work-
ers.7 
However, while the numerous adjustments to the labor con-
tract system have dramatically increased employee rights, they 
have failed at enforcing such rights and ensuring these workers 
access to legal remedy. Due to both a lack of knowledge8 and 
insufficient funds to spend on legal counsel, Chinese workers 
are often unaware or unable to access their statutory rights.9 
Therefore, a more prudent approach to the problems of Chinese 
workers would be to create programs to publicize employee 
rights and pass legislation that incentivizes Chinese attorneys 
to take LCL violation cases at little or no cost to the workers. 
To achieve these goals and provide adequate legal remedy to 
the Chinese workforce, China should implement both a modi-
fied attorney fee-shifting program that emphasizes merit-based 
awards as well as a poster notification system to increase 
knowledge of employment rights. The combination of these mi-
nor adjustments to China’s labor contract system will increase 
employee knowledge of their statutory rights and create a pow-
erful financial motivation for Chinese lawyers to represent em-
ployee plaintiffs. 
This Note will address the development of the labor contract 
system in China as it transformed from a plan-based system to 
one built around labor contracts and will advocate for legisla-
tive changes to better ensure workers’ access to their statutory 
rights. Part I will address the history of the labor contract sys-
tem as well as the current problems faced by many Chinese la-
borers. Part II will provide background on the concept of attor-
ney fee shifting, its use in American Civil Rights cases, and 
some of the problems the system has created for municipalities. 
Finally, Part III will suggest a modified version of attorney fee 
shifting and a poster notification system for use in China, 
                                                                                                                            
 7. See Vikas Bajaj, Chinese Workers’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES TAKING NOTE 
(Feb. 8, 2013, 2:19 PM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/chinese-workers-rights. 
 8. See Aaron Halegua, Note, Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes 
of China’s Migrant Workers, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 254, 256 (2008) 
 9. See Xingni Liang, Attorney Fee-Shifting and Labor Rights in China, 
LABOR IS NOT A COMMODITY (Dec. 4, 2009), 
http://laborrightsblog.typepad.com/international_labor_right/2009/12/attorne
y-fee-shifting-and-labor-rights-in-china.html. 
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which will provide laborers with knowledge and access to the 
employment rights elicited in the Labor Contract Law as well 
as avoid some of the major burdens attorney fee shifting has 
created in the United States.  
I. BACKGROUND 
a. The Iron Rice Bowl: China’s Plan-Based Economic Model 
In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in-
herited a nation decimated by years of war and civil strife.10 
The repercussions of the Second Sino-Japanese War,11 followed 
by the Chinese Civil War, had left China in a dire economic 
state and provided the newly established communist govern-
ment with substantial obstacles.12 As the PRC came into power, 
over 4.7 million people in urban areas were unemployed.13 Fur-
thermore, inflation resulting from the Chinese government’s 
overproduction of currency led to heightened prices and threw 
many rural families into severe poverty.14 
In an attempt to maintain social stability and build a success-
ful economic system out of rubble, the PRC followed the foot-
steps of the Soviet Union and implemented a “plan-based” eco-
nomic system.15 Through this system, the PRC combined ex-
pansive state ownership of industry with central control over 
prices and production.16 The purpose of such a centralized plan 
                                                                                                                            
 10. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2; see also BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, 
at 4. 
 11. Sino-Japanese War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/546188/Sino-Japanese-War (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
 12. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4. 
 13. Leung, supra note 1, at 2. 
 14. Richard Ebeling, The Great Chinese Inflation, FREEMAN, Dec. 2004, at 
2, 3. China experienced severe inflation throughout the 1940s after China 
“took the country off the silver standard, made its bank notes legal tender, 
and placed the country on a fiat currency with government in full control of 
the quantity of money.” Id. 
 15. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4. 
 16. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4; see also Yiwen Fei, The Insti-
tutional Change in China after its Reform in 1979: An Institutional Analysis 
with a Focus on Mergers and Acquisitions (Nov. 18, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam), available at 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/6854/. China’s centrally-planned economy determined 
prices by “administrative rather than market mechanisms and [allocated 
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was to “raise domestic saving . . . by extracting resources from 
the rural sector, and . . . channel[ing] these funds toward in-
dustrial growth.” 17  However, to achieve such a goal, China 
needed to increase employment in both urban and rural areas 
of the country.18 To this end, the PRC began a program of “gov-
ernment . . . job assignment through labor and education bu-
reaus” in order to fill vacancies in state-owned enterprises and 
curb the massive unemployment rates throughout the urban 
sector.19 
This system of employment soon became known as the “iron 
rice bowl,”20 by which the government provided life-long em-
ployment and benefits for those assigned state-run positions.21 
Because these state-run positions remained solely in urban ar-
eas and were restricted to urban residents, 22 the PRC subse-
quently limited urban migration from rural areas of China 
through the Household Registration Regulations of 1958.23 
The PRC used these laws to divide the population of China 
into two groups, urban and rural, based on a person’s 
hometown at the time of the law’s implementation.24 Mobility 
between the two groups was highly uncommon and extremely 
                                                                                                                            
resources] by central planners rather than by forces of supply and demand.” 
Id. at 29. Furthermore, China emphasized state industry development and 
focused on the expansion of heavy industry at the sacrifice of agricultural 
development. See id. 
 17. BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4. 
 18. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Jia Ching Chen, From the Iron Rice Bowl to the Steel Cafeteria 
Tray, in FACTORY TOWNS IN SOUTH CHINA 45 (Stefan Al ed., 2012), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/1897603/_From_the_Iron_Rice_Bowl_to_the_Steel_
Cafete-
ria_Tray_in_Factory_Towns_in_South_China_edited_by_S._Al_2012_Hong_K
ong_Hong_Kong_University_Press. 
 21. See id.; Fei, supra note 16. Fear that private organizations would be 
unwilling to reinvest profits in future government programs eventually led to 
the nationalization of private banking and industrial enterprises. With these 
enormous enterprises under state control and a government policy emphasiz-
ing industrial development, the number of “government jobs” expanded great-
ly. Id. 
 22. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2. 
 23. Id.; Kam Wing Chan, Registration System and Migrant Labor in Chi-
na: Notes on a Debate, 36 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 357, 357-58 (2010). 
 24. Leung, supra note 1, at 2. 
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difficult.25 Because only urban residents were entitled to gov-
ernment job assignment and its life-long employment guaran-
tee,26 the PRC used the housing registration system to avoid a 
complete abandonment of the rural sector.27 
The results of the PRC’s plan-based economic system were 
dramatic in the sectors affected28 but, overall, failed to utilize 
the true potential of the Chinese workforce.29 The PRC’s eco-
nomic model achieved moderate progress in the creation of 
human capital30 and the introduction of new industries.31 Spe-
cifically, mortality among both children and new mothers de-
clined, school attendance and academic achievement of stu-
dents increased, and new vehicle manufacturers and power 
plant industries began to develop.32 However, these achieve-
ments were overshadowed by the tremendous failure to proper-
ly utilize China’s massive working class.33 A prime example of 
the inefficiency34 and redundancy that plagued the PRC’s sys-
tem was the man-made famine of 1959, which killed over thirty 
million Chinese people.35  Furthermore, the industries devel-
                                                                                                                            
 25. Chan, supra note 23, at 358 (“Hukou conversion, referring to change 
from the rural to the urban category, was tightly controlled and permitted 
only under very limited conditions, usually when needed for the state’s indus-
trialization objectives.”). 
 26. Leung, supra note 1, at 2. 
 27. See id.; Chan, supra note 23, at 358 (arguing that the registration sys-
tem was intended to prevent “‘undesirable’ rural-to-urban migratory flows”). 
 28. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5. 
 29. See Fei, supra note 16, at 33. 
 30. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5. 
 31. See Fei, supra note 16, at 25. 
 32. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5. 
 33. See id. at 5-6. 
 34. See Fei, supra note 16, at 38-39. The Planned Economic System suf-
fered primarily from two forms of inefficiency: allocative inefficiency and x-
inefficiency. First, “because prices were determined in an administrative way 
instead of by the forces of supply and demand,” consumer preferences had no 
influence on production. Id. at 38. Second, with infinite funds generated by 
the state, and specific production requirements, State-Owned Enterprises 
(“SOEs”) had no fear of suffering a loss and would receive no reward for mak-
ing a profit. Therefore, the SOEs held no incentive to maintain an efficient 
business structure. Id. 
 35. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5; see Vaclav Smil, China’s 
Great Famine: 40 Years Later, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 1619 (1999), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/319/7225/1619 (identifying one of the key origins 
of the famine as Mao Zedong’s decision to focus state-run business efforts 
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oped under the system were plagued with overemployment, 
lack of innovation, and low labor morale.36 The PRC system’s 
deficiencies were exacerbated by the PRC’s almost isolationist 
approach to the world economy,37 which removed Chinese firms 
from the motivation of international competition and left them 
with the excessive costs of inefficient labor.38 The PRC’s eco-
nomic plan had faltered and left the Chinese people, once 
again, in need of change. 
b. Introduction of the Labor Contract System: The 1995 Labor 
Law 
After the death of the first Chairman of the PRC, Mao 
Zedong, in 1976,39 it became widely accepted that a systematic 
change of China’s economy was necessary.40 In an attempt to 
“restore the link between effort and reward” and jumpstart the 
stagnant and unmotivated Chinese workforce, China began to 
experiment with a labor contract system for small sectors of 
state-run enterprises and at the same time increased the na-
tion’s presence within the international market.41 Beginning in 
1978, labor contracts “were first tried out on joint ventures in 
Shenzhen and were given statutory recognition by the Provi-
                                                                                                                            
heavily in steel production instead of food production). The “Great Leap For-
ward,” Mao Zedong’s economic model to quickly establish China as an indus-
trialized and internationally competitive state, mobilized Chinese workers 
around the primary goal of industrialization leading to severe neglect of Chi-
nese agriculture and the food supply. William Harms, China’s Great Leap 
Forward, UNIV. CHI. CHRON. (Mar. 14, 1996), 
http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/960314/china.shtml. Many Chinese peasants 
were pressured to build “backyard furnaces for iron and steel” and were often 
recruited away from their farms to work on government building projects. Id. 
This excessive emphasis on industrialization continued to the point where 
grain harvests were left in the fields to rot and millions of people began to die 
of starvation. Id. 
 36. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2; see BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 
5-6. 
 37. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 6, 12. 
 38. See id. at 6. 
 39. China Celebrates 120 Years Since Mao Zedong’s Birth, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Dec. 26, 2013), http://dw.de/p/1Ah3S. 
 40. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 8. 
 41. Id. at 9, 11. 
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sions for Labor Management in Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures of 
1980.”42 
The success of these labor contract programs and the expan-
sion into the international economy led to further implementa-
tion throughout the coastal regions of China43 and eventually a 
national presence in the Labor Law of 1995. The Labor Law of 
1995 was used to nationalize the labor contract approach and 
end the lingering socialist distinction between state-owned en-
terprises (“SOEs”) and foreign-invested enterprises (“FIEs”).44 
The Labor Law of 1995 implemented contract law principles 
to all SOEs and FIEs demanding that all employers form labor 
contracts with their employees that explicitly spell out terms 
and conditions for employment and termination.45 The Labor 
Law of 1995 was an innovative attempt to both motivate the 
Chinese workforce and guarantee certain employee rights.46 
The law emphasized new protections prohibiting discrimina-
tion and child labor, and guaranteed equal pay for equal 
work.47 Additionally, labor contracts were required to contain 
descriptions of work duties, duration of employment, and 
grounds for termination.48 The Labor Law of 1995 achieved 
great progress in improving employment mobility, which great-
ly decreased the redundant and inefficient use of human capi-
tal. 49  Furthermore, through defining rights and obligations 
within the employee-employer relationship, the Labor Law of 
1995 succeeded in pinning down these responsibilities and sta-
                                                                                                                            
 42. Leung, supra note 1, at 2. Early labor contract requirements can be 
found in the Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979 and the Cooperative Joint 
Venture Law of 1988, which held identical requirements that “the employ-
ment, dismissal, remuneration, welfare, labor protection and labor insurance 
of the staff members and workers of an equity joint venture shall be specified 
in contracts.” Id. at 3. 
 43. See id. at 2-3. 
 44. See id. at 3. Prior to the Labor Law, SOEs, as distinct from foreign-
invested enterprises (“FIEs”), retained much of the socialist ideology concern-
ing lifetime job security, benefits, and assigned job placement. Even as nar-
rower legislation in 1986 attempted to provide greater autonomy to SOE em-
ployees, as of 1993, only a quarter of all SOE employees held labor contracts. 
Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 3-4. 
 47. Id. at 6. 
 48. See id. at 3. 
 49. Id. at 2-4. 
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bilizing a chaotic system where employment conditions were 
often arbitrary.50 
Despite the progressive steps the Chinese government took 
through implementing the Labor Law of 1995, the resulting 
privatization of many previously state-owned businesses and 
the abandonment of the job assignment programs led to a high 
unemployment rate, particularly among migrant workers.51 By 
2006, over 160 million workers had flooded from rural to urban 
areas in search of work, but without urban residential status, 
these workers were often treated as second-class citizens and 
discriminated against by employers.52 In the same year, studies 
conducted by the Economic Intelligence Unit found that over 
70% of migrant workers were employed unlawfully without 
contracts.53 When contracts were signed, employers often uti-
lized the availability of short-term contracts to prioritize enter-
prise flexibility over the development of their employees.54 Em-
ployers began hiring employees for numerous short-term con-
tracts in order to avoid labor costs associated with long-term 
employment. 55  Despite the government’s intention to bring 
about stable, long-term contract positions, many employers 
provided contracts lasting for less than two years.56 In order to 
adjust the Labor Law of 1995 to better deal with the modern 
issues facing Chinese employees, particularly migrant workers 
and fixed-employment contract employees, China enacted the 
Labor Contract Law of 2008.57 
c. The Labor Contract Law of 2008 
The Labor Contract Law of 2008 reiterated that all working 
relationships required written contracts.58 The LCL heightened 
employment costs and increased penalties for employers that 
were caught hiring employees without written contracts. 59 
                                                                                                                            
 50. Id. at 3-5. 
 51. See id. at 7. 
 52. Id. 
 53. ANNE-MARIE KONTAKOS, THE EFFECT OF THE LABOR CONTRACT LAW ON 
HR IN CHINA 33, 35 (2007). 
 54. See Leung, supra note 1, at 6. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 8. 
 58. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 10. 
 59. See id. 
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Most notably, if an employer delayed writing a new employee’s 
contract for too long, the LCL mandated that this employee 
would automatically receive an open-ended contract.60 
Similar to the Labor Law of 1995, the LCL mandated that all 
employees be classified as either fixed-term or open-ended con-
tract employees, but the LCL went a step further and con-
tained new provisions to curb improper reliance on short-term 
contracts. Article 14 of the LCL specified the situations in 
which a fixed or short-term contract employee could automati-
cally obtain an open-ended contract.61 This substantial exten-
sion of the labor contract regulations was meant to limit the 
use of fixed-term contracts and encourage the use of long-term 
and open contracts.62 
                                                                                                                            
 60. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 37. 
 61. Id. at 34. Article 14 of the LCL automatically transforms an employee’s 
fixed-term contract into an open-ended contract when certain criteria are 
met. Specifically, a fixed-term contract will become open-ended when an em-
ployee wishes to renew or adjust the terms of a contract at the end of its 
term, the employer fails to request the new contract be of a fixed-term, and 
any of the following requirements are met. 
(1) The employee has been working for the Employer for ten (10) 
consecutive years;  
(2) When the Employer first introduces the labor contract system or 
the state-owned enterprise that employs him re-concludes its labor 
contracts as of restructuring, the employee has been working for the 
Employer for ten (10) consecutive years and is less than 10 years 
away from his legal retirement age; or  
(3) Where a labor contract was concluded as a fixed-term labor con-
tract on two consecutive occasions and the employee, in the absence 
of any of the circumstances stipulated in Article 39 and items (1) and 
(2) of Article 40 of this law, renews such contract.  
If an Employer fails to conclude a written labor contract with an em-
ployee within one (1) year from the date the employee commences 
work, they shall be deemed to have entered into an open-ended labor 
contract. 
Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 14. 
 62. See Leung, supra note 1, at 8; Kungang Li, Practice and Problems: The 
Fixed-Term Employment Contract in China, in REGULATION OF FIXED-TERM 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 127, 136 (Roger 
Blanpain, Hiroya Nakakubo & Takashi Araki eds., 2010). The expansive use 
of fixed-term employment in China has led to a number of labor issues for 
Chinese workers. See Leung, supra note 1, at 6. First, the scarcity of em-
ployment and the abundance of human resources in China have discouraged 
workers from reporting substantial employment rights violations. Li, supra, 
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Additionally, the LCL clarified parts of the Labor Law of 
1995 concerning termination procedures, severance, and the 
use of dispatch workers.63 The LCL placed heightened regula-
tions on how employers could terminate fixed-contract employ-
ees.64 As opposed to the unilateral “at-will” approach of the La-
bor Law of 1995, the LCL limited employee termination to two 
situations: termination for cause and termination as part of a 
“mass-layoff.”65 
Furthermore, the LCL attempted to maintain some of the 
benefits of the “iron rice bowl” system through the use of al-
most guaranteed severance. The LCL required employers to 
pay severance to an employee if a fixed contract expired and 
the employer failed to renew the contract, except where the 
employer had offered to renew employment under equal or bet-
ter terms and the employee refused.66 Further details are elic-
ited in the LCL concerning when severance must be paid, but it 
is fair to say that in almost all foreseeable termination scenari-
os, severance would result.67 The amount of severance to be 
paid is “set at one month’s salary for each year of employment, 
up to a maximum of twelve years.”68 
To ensure that employers could not circumvent the LCL by 
hiring workers through a third-party employment agency in 
order to avoid the use of direct employment contracts, the LCL 
also included provisions concerning the use of dispatch work-
ers, or employees hired by a dispatch agency but contracted to 
                                                                                                                            
at 129. Fear that their employer would not renew their employment contract 
coupled with the expense of legal representation has led many workers to 
simply abide pervasive employee rights abuses. Leung, supra note 1, at 6. 
Second, without a promise of long-term employment, the Chinese workforce 
has become increasingly mobile. Id. at 5. This enhanced mobility and high 
employee transfer rate has made employers reluctant to invest in and train 
their workers, limiting their employees’ professional growth. Id. 
 63. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53. Labor dispatch workers are temporary 
staff that are hired and officially contracted by a dispatch agency. They are 
then sent to various third-party “host employers” to work. Dexter Roberts, 
Why China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers, BLOOBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-
03-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-to-temp-workers. 
 64. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 35. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 39. 
 68. Id. 
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work for a separate “host” employer.69 First, to make sure for-
eign companies did not rely on foreign employment agencies, 
the LCL required all foreign company representatives to use 
dispatch agencies in China to hire any PRC nationals.70 Se-
cond, the LCL encouraged employers to hire employees directly 
by describing dispatch employee positions as supplementary, 
replacement, or temporary.71 Third, the LCL required dispatch 
agencies and dispatch employees to use, at a minimum, two-
year employment agreements.72 Procedures for termination of 
dispatch employees were also greatly limited,73 and should an 
employee be terminated prior to the end of the employee’s con-
tract, the dispatch agency was required to pay the employee 
minimum wage for the remaining term of the contract.74 
Finally, in an attempt to ease access to legal remedy, Article 
30 of the LCL allowed all workers to “sue directly in court for 
unpaid wages without first going through [the previously re-
quired] labor arbitration process.”75 Article 94 of the LCL also 
clarified that host employers were jointly and severally liable 
for violations performed by a contracting agency or dispatch 
employer.76 
While the Labor Contract Law of 2008 made substantial pro-
gress in terms of declaring certain contractual obligations and 
employee rights, the implementation and enforcement of such 
rights has not been as profound.77 Although studies on the use 
                                                                                                                            
 69. See id. at 37. 
 70. Id.; BRYAN CAVE LLP, CHINA AMENDS LABOR CONTRACT LAW TO 
ELIMINATE LABOR DISPATCH ABUSE 1 (2013), available at 
www.bryancave.com/bulletins/Detail.aspx?pub=4137. 
 71. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 66. 
 72. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 58. 
 73. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 35. 
 74. See id. at 37; Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 93. 
 75. Xiaoying Li, How Does China’s New Labor Contract Law Affect Float-
ing Workers? 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19254, 
2011), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/papers/How%20Does%20China%2
7s%20New%20Labour%20Contract%20Law%20Affect%20Floating%20Worke
rs%20in%20China%20_Xiaoying%20Li_.pdf. 
 76. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 94. 
 77. See JEFFREY BECKER & MANFRED ELFSTROM, THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S 
LABOR CONTRACT LAW ON WORKERS (2010), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/papers/How%20Does%20China’s%
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of labor contracts after the implementation of the LCL found 
an increased number of employees holding some form of a labor 
contract,78 these contracts are still not as universal as the law 
demands and often omit provisions required under the LCL.79 
Furthermore, interviewed migrant employees have reported 
that employers often utilize hiring tricks to circumvent the re-
quirements of the LCL. 80  Specifically, employers have used 
“English-language only contracts, blank or covered-over con-
tracts,” divided contracts with half pay in each, and six-day 
week assignments at 6.7 hours per day in an attempt to avoid 
potential overtime, wage discrepancies, and other violations of 
worker’s rights under the LCL.81 Dispatch workers have fared 
even worse as their suggested “supplemental” use has become 
increasingly popular. The LCL’s ambiguous language describ-
ing the use of dispatch employees and the dire worldwide eco-
nomic climate during the LCL’s implementation led to exces-
sive reliance on dispatch workers.82 Employers have cited poor 
economic conditions as justification for layoffs in violation of 
the LCL and have fired employees simply to rehire them under 
less favorable contract provisions.83 Despite the enhanced regu-
lations of the LCL, years after its implementation the dispatch 
system has become “abnormally prosperous,” 84  and dispatch 
                                                                                                                            
20New%20Labour%20Contract%20Law%20Affect%20Floating%20Workers%
20in%20China%20_Xiaoying%20Li_.pdf. 
 78. See id. at 7; Li, supra note 75, at 12-16. 
 79. BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 7. Only 60% of surveyed work-
ers had a contract at the time of their interview, and many interviewees com-
plained that the contracts they did have lacked certain required provisions. 
Id. 
 80. See id. at 10. 
 81. Id. A study conducted by China’s Ministry of Public Security reported 
that in 2005 alone, approximately 87,000 public protests occurred, many of 
them involving migrant workers, resulting from “unpaid wages, lost land 
rights and working conditions.” KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 34. 
 82. Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, JINAN 
DAILY, Feb. 28, 2011, available at www.clntranslations.org/file_download/140. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. As of 2010, data obtained by the All-China Federation of Trade Un-
ions showed that the number of domestic labor dispatch workers had reached 
sixty million, approximately 20% of all domestic workers in China. Id. 
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employees have consistently received diminished wages and 
less-protected health and safety rights.85 
Host employers often rely on workers not understanding the 
full breadth of their statutory rights under the LCL and use 
the dispatch agency as a buffer to excuse illegal actions such as 
docking wages, benefits, and severance pay.86 Some employers 
have even begun to exploit potential employees by charging 
“security deposits” to begin work or charging fees for incidents 
of company “insubordination.” 87  Additionally, China’s new-
found presence within the international economy spurred a 
sudden burst of foreign investment and industrial growth.88 
Tied to this foreign investment in China is the challenge of in-
ternational competition, making the prospect of skirting 
heightened labor costs appealing to both state- and foreign-
                                                                                                                            
 85. See Yu, supra note 5; Jennifer Cheung, Workers at State-Owned Oil 
Company Step Up Demand for Equal Pay for Equal Work, CHINA LABOUR 
BULL. (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/workers-state-owned-
oil-company-step-demand-equal-pay-equal-work. One study of 600 auxiliary 
workers at a state-owned oil company in Shaanxi, conducted during a protest, 
asserted that their monthly pay was only 2000 yuan, compared with the 
monthly pay of 5000 yuan for the few remaining formal employees. Id. 
 86. See Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, su-
pra note 82; BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 16. Although Article 94 of 
the LCL holds host employers jointly liable for the violations of the LCL 
committed by contracted dispatch agencies, the true appeal for host employ-
ers lies simply in remaining one step removed from the rights employees are 
guaranteed by law. See Roberts, supra note 63. Host employers are not direct-
ly responsible for paying dispatch workers’ social security installments, 
workers compensation, or even severance pay. Erin Wigger & Peter Schnall, 
The Role of Dispatched Labor in the Exploitation of Chinese Workers, 
UNHEALTHY WORK (Aug. 18, 2012), 
http://unhealthyworkblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-role-of-dispatched-labor-
in.html. Rather, to access these benefits, dispatch workers must first reach 
out to the dispatch agency that hired them, with whom many have had little 
or no contact with since they began their employment. CHINA LABOR WATCH, 
BEYOND FOXCONN: DEPLORABLE WORKING CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZE APPLE’S 
ENTIRE SUPPLY CHAIN 17 (2012). Furthermore, workers are often completely 
unaware of the option of legal remedy against either the dispatch agency or 
their host employer and simply accept their losses and once again begin the 
search for work. Id. (“Most workers do not know where their dispatch compa-
ny is located or even the company’s name. With little understanding of the 
law, most workers will just think they have lost their job and will not go 
through the trouble of demanding their rights.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
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owned companies. Too often these companies found one of the 
primary means of cutting labor costs was the abuse of dispatch 
workers, an issue China realized was in dire need of resolu-
tion.89 
d. Addressing the “Dispatch” Issue: The Amended Labor Con-
tract Law of 2013 
In response to the increasing reliance on and abuse of dis-
patch workers, the PRC amended four sections of the 2008 LCL 
with the Amended PRC Labor Contract Law of 2013 (“2013 
Amendments”).90 The essence of these amendments was a push 
by the Chinese government to make direct hiring the primary 
means of employment in China.91 The four 2013 Amendments 
came into effect on July 1, 2013, and address principle concerns 
with the hope to both curtail the rampant abuse of the dispatch 
system and clarify when hiring dispatch workers is appropri-
ate. 
First, the 2013 Amendments modify Article 57 of the LCL, 
specifically to require labor dispatch agencies to have an “ap-
propriate fixed place of business” and a “minimum registered 
capital” of 2,000,000 RMB.92 The basic thrust of this change 
makes bringing suit against a dispatch agency easier to accom-
plish. With a fixed business location and substantial registered 
capital, dispatch agencies will have more funds for workers to 
collect should their rights be violated.93 Second, Article 63’s re-
quirement of equal pay for equal work was enhanced to require 
host companies, in addition to dispatch agencies, to implement 
the same payment allocation for both dispatch and direct-hire 
employees.94 Third, Article 66 was revised to state “labor dis-
patch employment can ‘only’ be adopted for temporary, auxilia-
                                                                                                                            
 89. See id. at 13; see Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to 
Protect, supra note 82. 
 90. See Yu, supra note 5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. BRYAN CAVE LLP, supra note 70, at 2. 
 93. Victoria Ding & Ron Cai, Amendments to the Labor Contract Law on 
Labor Dispatch Services Take Effect July 1, 2013, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE 
LLP (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/Amendments-to-the-Labor-
Contract-Law-on-Labor-Dispatch-Services-Take-Effect-July-1-2013-01-31-
2013/. 
 94. BRYAN CAVE LLP, supra note 70, at 2. 
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ry, or substitute positions.”95 Furthermore, the terms were de-
fined as follows: 
Temporary: positions that will exist for no more than six 
months; 
Auxiliary: positions that are not the core-business-related po-
sitions in the company. Most government labor officials take 
the view that non-core-business-related positions comprise 
cafeteria workers, security guards, cleaning staff, reception-
ists etc.; 
Substitute: positions that must be temporarily filled when an 
employee is on full-time study or long-term leave (e.g., mater-
nity).96 
Article 66 was also revised to implement a “to-be-determined” 
maximum percentage of dispatch workers in relation to all 
workers that could be hired by an employer.97 Finally, Article 
92 was amended to require businesses caught engaging in la-
bor dispatch services without a license to not only forfeit illegal 
gains, but also to face fines of up to five times their illegal 
gains.98 Article 92 also increased the fine to 10,000 RMB per 
worker for labor dispatch agencies and host employers that vio-
late the LCL and do not fix the problem within a predeter-
mined period.99 
Clearly, if properly enforced, the 2013 Amendments to the 
LCL would make the use of labor dispatch workers less appeal-
ing for host employers.100 The dramatic change in required reg-
istered capital, from 500,000 RMB to 2 million RMB, will drive 
many of the smaller enterprises out of business and, in turn, 
drive up costs for host employers still using the dispatch sys-
tem.101 Additionally, the restriction to “temporary, auxiliary, or 
substitute” positions will likely prevent many of the positions 
                                                                                                                            
 95. Id. 
 96. WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, AMENDMENT TO PRC LABOR CONTRACT LAW 
INCLUDES SIGNIFICANT CHANGES REGARDING DISPATCH ARRANGEMENTS (2013), 
available at http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/1/4/v2/1416.pdf. 
 97. See BRYAN CAVE LLP, supra note 70, at 2. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Ding & Cai, supra note 93. 
 101. See id. 
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previously held by dispatch workers from legally qualifying as 
appropriate for dispatch employment.102 
Furthermore, in order to clarify any ambiguity surrounding 
the adjustments made to Article 66, on August 7, 2013, the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued a re-
quest for public comments on a draft adjustment of the labor 
dispatch section of the 2013 Amendments.103 These Draft Labor 
Dispatch Regulations (“Draft Regulations”), while not yet en-
acted as law, would further restrict the use of dispatch work-
ers.104 Primarily, the Draft Regulations suggest two distinct 
changes to the LCL as amended by the 2013 Amendments: 
First, it would require host employers to clearly lay out what 
positions within their office qualify as auxiliary positions.105 
This list of auxiliary positions would be reviewable by the host 
employer’s labor union or employee representative and publi-
cized to all employees.106 Additionally, the maximum amount of 
auxiliary positions would be set at 10% of the combined direct-
hire employees and current dispatched auxiliary workers, not 
including any temporary or substitute positions.107 Second, the 
Draft Regulations clarify a host employer’s status as equally 
liable as the dispatch-employer.108 Similar to Article 94, this 
draft regulation serves to eliminate the ability of host employ-
ers to avoid liability for LCL violations committed by contract-
ed dispatch agencies. Although not yet enacted as law, when 
viewed as a whole, the Draft Regulations suggest that China is 
continuing its legislative push to eliminate reliance on dispatch 
employees by greatly limiting their legitimate use. 
e. The Persistent Problem of Enforcement 
Although labor rights of Chinese workers have increased 
dramatically through the use of the Labor Law of 1995, the La-
                                                                                                                            
 102. See id. 
 103. Elizabeth Cole, Mark Weeks & Yumiko Ohta, China Labor Contract 
Law Amendments on Dispatch Employees Come into Effect—Implementation 
Details Still Uncertain, COVENTUS LAW (August 27, 2013), 
http://www.conventuslaw.com/china-labor-contract-law-amendments-on-
dispatch-employees-come-into-effect-implementation-details-still-uncertain/. 
 104. Wilson, supra note 6. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
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bor Contract Law of 2008, the 2013 Amendments to the Labor 
Contract Law, and potentially the 2013 Draft Regulations, a 
persistent problem for Chinese laborers is the poor enforcement 
of the law.109 As of 2010, three years after the approval of the 
LCL, one study found that out of employees interviewed, only 
“sixty percent . . . had a contract at the time of their interview; 
[and that] 53 percent . . . had contracts before the law went into 
effect.”110 As addressed above, many of these individuals felt 
their contracts omitted key provisions that were required by 
law.111 Similarly, dispatch workers, who are most affected by 
the ineffective execution of the LCL, have even begun to protest 
the lack of enforcement of Article 63’s equal-pay-for-equal work 
requirement.112 Despite the fact that many of these workers 
perform the same function as direct-hire employees, dispatch 
workers receive less than half the compensation.113 Arguably, 
the primary impediment to Chinese workers, especially dis-
patch workers, is lack of access to the rights granted to them 
under Chinese law. Therefore, simply amending the current 
labor statutes to include further regulations and expanded 
“rights” for workers will not solve the problem. Rather, through 
the use of an attorney fee-shifting program for LCL violations 
and an enhanced notification system of legal rights and reme-
dies, China can give bite to its labor legislation and provide 
workers with the rights their nation has promised them. 
II. WHAT IS AN ATTORNEY FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE? 
The basis of an attorney fee-shifting system is that the loser 
in a bout of litigation is required to pay for the winning party’s 
attorney fees. 114  The concept is utilized in various fashions 
across the world and is rooted in two main principles: 1) that 
defeat in litigation justifies the imposition of legal fees on the 
losing party, and 2) that the winner in litigation deserves full 
                                                                                                                            
 109. Liu Xuetan, counsel to the auxiliary workers, has stated, “Although 
the law prohibits unequal pay for equal work, when it comes to enforcement, 
that’s a very different story.” Cheung, supra note 85. 
 110. BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 7. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Cheung, supra note 85. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A 
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L. REV. 651 (1982). 
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compensation, not detracted by attorney fees, to be made fully 
whole.115 The policy incentives inherent to the idea of fee shift-
ing concern the extensive financial burden created by litiga-
tion. The imposition of attorney fees upon a losing party acts as 
a great deterrent to frivolous lawsuits,116 eases the backlog of 
cases for the courts, and makes headway toward fully compen-
sating the winning litigant.117 
a. The Development of Attorney Fee Shifting in America 
Unlike a majority of states, the United States legal system 
has relied primarily on a system of up-front payment where 
each party is responsible for their own litigation costs regard-
less of the outcome.118 This American rule seems to have grown 
not out of policy incentives but rather through a combination of 
early distrust of the legal profession and legislative refusal to 
address the issue.119 Scholars have argued that a great disdain 
for attorneys, who were seen as an “unnecessary luxury,” de-
veloped within colonial America and continued into the early 
United States.120 This level of distrust and hostility aimed at 
the legal profession made the concept of court-ordered attorney 
fees an unpopular subject.121 Furthermore, after the Revolu-
tionary War, as American courts began to experiment with the 
concept of attorney fee shifting, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
mained persistently hostile to acceptance of such a system. In 
both Arcambel v. Wiseman and Day v. Wood-worth, some of the 
earliest Supreme Court cases where attorney fee shifting was 
raised, the Court refused to legitimize the practice.122 Rather, 
the Court emphasized the “general practice” of American juris-
                                                                                                                            
 115. David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Con-
trasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 589 (2005). 
 116. See Rowe, supra note 114. 
 117. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the 
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 637-38 (1974). 
 118. See Root, supra note 115, at 585. 
 119. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, su-
pra note 117, at 640. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796); Day v. Wood-worth, 54 
U.S. 363 (1851) (identifying the early practice of the United States Supreme 
Court to refuse requests for attorney fees to even a successful litigant). 
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prudence to deny requests for attorney fees and passed the 
burden of such determinations to the legislature.123 
However, as American jurisprudence evolved, the strict ad-
herence to the American rule waivered, opening up six main 
categories of exceptions to the ban on attorney fee shifting.124 
Generally, American courts have found exceptions to the ban 
on attorney fee shifting in cases involving 1) contracts, 2) bad 
faith, 3) the common fund doctrine, 4) the substantial benefit 
doctrine, 5) contempt, and 6) fee-shifting statutes.125 
One specific fee-shifting statute that has become extremely 
prevalent in the United States is the Civil Rights Attorney 
Fees Award Act of 1976.126 Under the Civil Rights Attorney 
Fees Award Act, otherwise known as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a “court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the 
costs.”127 The justification for this divergence from the tradi-
tional American system is based on policy concerns prioritizing 
the assurance of adequate “access to the judicial process for 
persons with civil rights grievances.”128 In an effort to expand 
recourse to the law for all citizens who have suffered a violation 
of their civil rights, this exception to the American rule encour-
ages meritorious lawsuits by eliminating both the expense of 
legal counsel and the chilling effect of attorney fees among po-
tential plaintiffs.129 
b. How Attorney Fee Shifting Works under 42 U.S.C. § 1988: 
The “Prevailing Party” 
The first issue to address in determining appropriate attor-
ney fees is who can actually demand such costs. Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, reasonable attorney fees are awarded to the 
“prevailing party” of civil rights litigation. This category explic-
                                                                                                                            
 123. See Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306; see also Court Awarded Attorney Fees and 
Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 117, at 640. 
 124. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, su-
pra note 117, at 640. 
 125. See id. 
 126. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1233 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 129. See Kaimowitz v. Howard, 547 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1982); 
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1993). 
1164 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
itly excludes the United States but allows plaintiffs, and in 
some cases defendants, to retain reasonable attorney fees when 
they succeed in litigation. Unless the parties have explicitly 
agreed to an alternate payment system, in cases where a set-
tlement is reached, courts have ruled that a plaintiff is auto-
matically deemed the prevailing party.130 However, prevailing 
defendants in civil rights actions are not always guaranteed 
attorney fees, even if they prevail in an action brought against 
them.131 Unlike plaintiff’s attorneys, who are entitled to attor-
ney fees unless the unique circumstances of the case would 
render such fees unjust,132 defendants are entitled to attorney 
fees only where the plaintiff’s underlying claim is frivolous, un-
reasonable, or groundless.133 
c. Reasonable Attorney Fees 
In regards to the calculation of “reasonable” attorney fees, 
great discretion is granted to the district court in its determi-
nation of fees, which is only subject to review for abuse of judi-
cial discretion.134 Judges may award whatever reasonable fees 
they deem necessary, but are free to limit compensation or 
grant it sparingly if they find the fee claims exorbitant or the 
time allegedly devoted to the litigation unreasonably high.135 A 
reasonable fee is described as one “sufficient to induce a capa-
ble attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious 
civil rights case,”136 but not one that simply acts as a “form of 
economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys.”137 
                                                                                                                            
 130. See Davis v. Jackson, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(“Court[s] [must] resist the . . . temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by 
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action 
must have been unreasonable or without foundation.”) (citation omitted); 
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000). 
 131. See Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 132. United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996); see Mus-
care v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 135. Gagne, 448 U.S. at 129. 
 136. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). 
 137. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 
U.S. 546, 565 (1986). 
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Currently, the Supreme Court uses the two-step lodestar 138 
method in calculating attorney fees.139 First, the court will mul-
tiply the reported hours an attorney has worked by the court-
determined hourly rate to generate the “lodestar amount.” Se-
cond, the court will adjust the lodestar amount based on any 
special circumstances of the case at bar.140 The determination 
of a reasonable hourly rate is often based on the prevailing 
market rate for an attorney of similar skill and experience 
within the relevant legal community, which is generally the 
forum in which the court sits.141 However, the Supreme Court 
has also authorized additional factors to consider in the deter-
mination of a reasonable hourly rate.142 The twelve factors that 
were developed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 
have been approved by both Congress and the Supreme Court 
and are as follows: 
(1) the time and labor required to litigate the suit; (2) 
the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented by 
the lawsuit; (3) the skill required [to] properly . . . per-
form the legal service; (4) the preclusion of other em-
ployment opportunities for the attorney due to the at-
torney’s acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for 
such services; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circum-
stances; (8) the amount in controversy involved and the 
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and 
ability of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the 
case; (11) the nature and length of the attorney’s profes-
                                                                                                                            
 138. Lodestar Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/lodestar (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). A lodestar is de-
fined as “something or someone that leads or guides a person or group of peo-
ple.” The two-prong lodestar analysis was first utilized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 
(1983). 
 139. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 551. 
 140. Brooks Magratten, Robert D. Phillips Jr., Thomas Connolly, Renee 
Feldman & Isaac Mamaysky, Trial Practice: Calculating Attorney Fee 
Awards, GPSOLO, Mar. 2010, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home
/gp_solo_magazine_index/magratten_phillips_connolly_feldman_mamaysky.h
tml. 
 141. See id.; see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 (1984). 
 142. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.  
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sional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in 
similar cases.143 
As to the second prong of the lodestar calculation, in 2010, 
the Supreme Court greatly reduced the possibility for adjust-
ments to the reasonable fee, permitting such post-lodestar 
changes only in “extraordinary circumstances.”144 In Perdue v. 
Kenny, the Court held that while the lodestar method was 
“never intended to be conclusive in all circumstances . . . there 
[remains] a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is rea-
sonable.”145 This presumption is almost universally upheld in 
actions arguing for a reduction of the lodestar amounts.146 Sim-
ilarly, upward adjustments occur rarely and only when pay-
ment of fees has been exceptionally delayed or where the attor-
ney’s work has been outstanding in the face of expensive and 
protracted litigation.147 Therefore, it is the twelve Johnson fac-
tors that weigh most heavily in the final determination of rea-
sonable attorney fees.148 
                                                                                                                            
 143. See Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1075 (4th Cir. 1986); Trimper v. City of 
Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 73 (1995); see also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–20 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve factors are commonly 
referred to as the Johnson factors due to their development in Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. Hill, 790 F.2d at 1077. Although in the Perdue 
dictum, the Supreme Court criticized the use of the Johnson factors, the 
Court ruled specifically on the strong presumption of reasonableness devel-
oped in determining the initial lodestar reasonable rate and “did not express-
ly state that a court should not use the Johnson factors to determine [this 
initial] lodestar figure.” Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, No. 4:11CV00043, 
2013 WL 4520023, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2013). Furthermore, after Per-
due, federal courts have continued to utilize the Johnson factors in develop-
ing an initial reasonable fee under the lodestar method. See, e.g., id.; Jackson 
v. Estelle’s Place, LLC, 391 F. App’x. 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2010); McClain v. 
Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2011); Trustees of Local 
531 Pension Fund v. Flexwrap Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590–91 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 144. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: The Lodestar as Gold Standard, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 21, 2010, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/analysis-the-lodestar-as-gold-standard/. 
 145. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553–54 (2010). 
 146. See Magratten et al., supra note 140. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Denniston, supra note 144. 
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d. Problems with the Current Attorney Fee-Shifting Rule 
Although providing legal recourse to the poor and most vul-
nerable populations is a justifiable pursuit, the Civil Rights At-
torney Fees Award Act of 1976 has led to growing problems for 
municipalities and their taxpayers within the United States.149 
The most basic of these issues is the granting of huge attorney 
fees in conjunction with modest jury awards to plaintiffs.150 Lit-
igation is a costly endeavor and can often drag on for years at a 
time.151 Attorney fees for civil rights cases vary, but often range 
from US$200 to US$500 per hour.152 These high hourly rates, 
combined with the heavy presumption against post-lodestar 
adjustments, make the initiation and protraction of litigation 
more appealing than securing justice for one’s client. Dragging 
litigation on for years with extensive statistical analysis, expert 
research, broad discovery, and numerous attorneys153 assigned 
to a case can lead to vastly disproportionate awards of attorney 
fees when compared to plaintiff awards.154 Additionally, plain-
tiff’s attorneys are also often awarded the same “reasonable 
fees” in cases where the parties reach an agreeable settle-
                                                                                                                            
 149. See Katherine Macfarlane, In Shira Scheindlin’s Courtroom, Stop-and-
Frisk Lawyers Are the Only Winners, NEW YORK OBSERVER (Nov. 13, 2013, 
7:00 AM), http://observer.com/2013/11/stop-and-frisk-lawyers/. 
 150. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986); see also Max 
McCann, Police Misconduct Litigation: Keeping an Open Mind, 
OVERLAWYERED (Sep. 23, 2013), http://overlawyered.com/police-abuse-
litigation-incentives-keeping-open-mind/. 
 151. See Pacific Research Institute, Study Claims U.S. ‘Tort Tax’ Tops 
$9,800 Per Family, INS. J. (Mar. 3, 2007), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/03/27/78137.htm. The 
study notes that America’s legal system imposes an economic cost of more 
than US$865 billion every year and leads to extensive defensive costs made 
to limit potential legal liability. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dept., 468 F. Supp. 2d 333, 339 (D. 
Conn. 2006); Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1398–99 (11th Cir. 
1996); Winston v. O’Brien, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 153. See Tucker v. City of New York, 704 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 154. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 149 (focusing on Daniels v. City of 
New York, where, after a settlement between the parties, plaintiffs’ counsels 
were awarded over US$3.5 million in fees and costs while the ten named 
plaintiffs received only US$167,000). 
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ment,155 which further encourages amassing clientele rather 
than diligent lawyering. The combination of high hourly rates, 
less merit-based awards, and a relaxed standard of “prevailing 
parties” for plaintiffs, has created a genuine market of civil 
rights litigation.156 However, although problems with fee shift-
ing must be acknowledged, the practice has ultimately proved a 
crucial tool in providing indigent claimants access to legal rem-
edy for violations of their civil rights.157 
III. APPLICATION TO CHINESE LABOR LAW 
a. Fee Shifting 
Despite the problems that the United States has faced in its 
use of fee-shifting statutes, it is exactly this type of litigation 
scheme that Chinese workers desperately need to gain access 
to their employment rights.158 The current crisis facing Chinese 
laborers, specifically dispatch laborers, is not a lack of statuto-
ry authority mandating specific employment practices, but ra-
ther a complete lack of knowledge and government enforce-
ment of these rights. However, the implementation of an attor-
ney-fee shifting program, similar to the United States’ Civil 
Rights Attorney Fee Act of 1976, can create an appealing mar-
ket for employment rights cases in China that will incentivize 
attorneys to actively seek out laborers in need of assistance. 
Through the use of attorney fees as a supplementary financial 
incentive, China can modify ordinary market conditions sur-
rounding LCL violation litigation and make it profitable to 
                                                                                                                            
 155. See Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 451 (9th Cir. 
2010); FED. R. CIV. P. 68; Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1985) (noting 
that in the context of Section 1983 civil rights actions, settlement offers made 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 include attorney fees within 
its definition of costs). 
 156. “In estimating the significance of any rise in civil suits against police 
officers, it’s worth keeping in mind that this is not just the pursuit of social 
justice. It’s an industry.” See McCann, supra note 150. 
 157. See Md. Access to Justice Comm’n, Fee-Shifting to Promote the Public 
Interest in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 38, 47–50 (2011). 
 158. See id. The Maryland Access to Justice Commission argues that the 
use of attorney fee shifting within the realm of U.S. civil rights cases has 
generated a beneficial market shaped around enhanced financial incentives 
for attorneys. Id. 
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connect individuals whose rights have been violated with 
groups who can adequately fight for their compensation.159 
China has already successfully tested the use of attorney fee 
shifting in other legal forums.160 In 1993, China began allowing 
prevailing parties under the Law Against Unfair Competition 
to seek out reasonable expenses associated with the investiga-
tion and litigation of their claims.161 Similarly, in 2002, China’s 
Supreme People’s Court specifically acknowledged the use of 
attorney fee shifting in cases of trademark infringement and 
other actions of copyright litigation.162 Additionally, despite a 
lack of statutory authorization, some Chinese courts have even 
implemented a fee-shifting approach on an ad hoc basis for suc-
cessful plaintiffs in consumer and personal injury cases.163 Fee 
shifting in these areas can arguably suggest a rising dissatis-
faction with the current payment system, in which each party 
pays their own attorney fees and many successful plaintiffs 
lose large portions of their awards to attorney commissions. 
Therefore implementation of this type of fee-shifting system 
would not be completely unprecedented, and would likely be 
well received by both laborers and plaintiff counsels. 
Currently, Chinese labor attorneys have few incentives to 
represent poor workers in employment rights cases. Migrant 
workers and dispatch workers on average earn only 1290 RMB 
per year, while the average commission for attorneys can range 
from 500 to 5000 RMB.164 This enormous investment in legal 
counsel greatly discourages employees from bringing small 
claims in the first place, and the small awards for unpaid wag-
es or overtime rarely cover the attorney commissions.165 For the 
claims pursued, cultural biases often lead Chinese law firms to 
avoid representing migrant workers, in particular, because 
they fear successful claimants will refuse to share any damage 
                                                                                                                            
 159. Id. at 38–39. 
 160. See Donald C. Clarke, The Private Attorney-General in China: Potential 
and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 241, 253 (2009). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See Liang, supra note 9. 
 165. See id. 
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award granted.166 Therefore, due to the small payout and pos-
sibility of lack of payment, Chinese law firms lack the financial 
incentive to seek out and diligently assist workers litigate LCL 
claims.167 
However, through the use of a modified attorney fee-shifting 
program, China can incentivize attorneys to find and accept 
employee rights cases, as well as litigate them to the best of 
their abilities. By adopting the American system of “reasonable 
hourly rates,” utilizing the twelve Johnson factors to determine 
reasonableness, and adopting the relaxed standard of “prevail-
ing party,” the financial incentive to represent employee rights 
claims would dramatically increase.168 Similar to the plaintiff’s 
attorneys in civil rights cases throughout the United States, 
the huge potential payout for attorneys would make litigating 
even minor employment rights claims extremely appealing.169 
Therefore, employees who previously lacked the funds neces-
sary to obtain legal counsel would have access at no personal 
cost. 
However, the vast benefits of attorney fee shifting should not 
overshadow the problem of excessive attorney fees in the face of 
nominal litigant awards. As addressed in Part II(d), the combi-
nation of high hourly rates, less merit-based enhancements or 
reductions, and a relaxed prevailing party standard has led to 
cases with attorney fees completely disproportionate from the 
plaintiff’s actual award.170 To remedy this issue, China must 
maintain the reasonableness requirements embodied in the 
Johnson factors, implement statutorily imposed maximum and 
minimum hourly rates, and place a heavier emphasis on merit-
based enhancements and reductions. The use of the Johnson 
                                                                                                                            
 166. See Yin Lily Zheng, Note, It’s Not What Is on Paper, but What Is in 
Practice: China’s New Labor Contract Law and the Enforcement Problem, 8 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 595, 606 (2009). 
 167. See id. 
 168. E.g., Macfarlane, supra note 149. In the context of American civil 
rights cases, Macfarlane details the significant financial incentive created for 
attorneys to litigate cases when attorney fee shifting, reasonable hourly 
rates, the twelve Johnson factors, and the relaxed standard of prevailing par-
ty have been implemented. 
 169. See McCann, supra note 150 (establishing the significant financial in-
centives for civil rights attorneys to bring “marginal, not just high-value” cas-
es to court). 
 170. See Riverside, 477 U.S. at 561; see McCann, supra note 150. 
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factors, when combined with set maximum and minimum rea-
sonable rates, will greatly temper the degree of attorney-fee 
liability employers may face in employment rights cases, but 
the emphasis on merit-based enhancements will balance this 
slight diminished incentive with a powerful motivation to pro-
vide high quality legal representation. 
Local government organizations are the best entities to set 
the appropriate range of attorney fees in determining maxi-
mum and minimum hourly rates. 171  Local governments can 
best balance the strong nationwide desire to provide access to 
legal remedy for employees with their own liability as an em-
ployer, along with the liability of private organizations in their 
locale. This balance of policy incentives will lead to an equita-
ble range of reasonable rates and will avoid the burdensome 
expenses seen in some civil rights cases in the United States.172 
Additionally, the dramatic limitations on American post-
lodestar adjustments should not be implemented in China’s at-
torney fee-shifting legislation. With the limits on reasonable 
attorney fees in place, lawyers will still hold a strong financial 
incentive to accept and litigate employment rights cases, but 
lack an incentive to provide effective and efficient lawyering. 
                                                                                                                            
 171. China is divided into twenty-two provinces, five “autonomous” regions, 
and four municipalities that are directly controlled by the Chinese central 
government. The provincial governments, the people’s governments of the 
autonomous regions, and the municipal governments under the Central Gov-
ernment, which exercise authority over these geographic sectors of China, are 
responsible for the implementation of local laws and regulations. China’s Po-
litical System: The Local Administrative System, CHINA.ORG, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 
2014). It is this level of government that would be best suited to address nec-
essary limitations on judicial discretion in determining appropriate attorney 
fees. 
 172. See, e.g., David D. Dudley & Frances Reynolds Colbert, Determining 
Reasonable Attorney Fees, 85 WIS. LAW. 10 (2012), available at 
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?
Volume=85&Issue=10&ArticleID=10217. In response to cases involving viola-
tions of consumer protection laws in which attorney fees far exceeded the 
awarded compensatory damages, Wisconsin enacted statute 814.045, which 
limits reasonable attorney fees to a maximum of three times the amount of 
compensatory damages awarded. This set limit is overcome only in rare cir-
cumstances where the court determines greater amounts are reasonable. Id. 
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Since a majority of cases in all actions result in settlement,173 
any system that refuses to award attorney fees in settled cases 
will eliminate the incentive for attorneys to work. Therefore, a 
better approach toward increasing the quality of advocacy pro-
vided to Chinese laborers is to give courts greater discretion in 
determining both reductions and enhancements to the final 
lodestar award. Rather than adopt the “extraordinary circum-
stances” requirement of Perdue,174 China should craft local leg-
islation that can incentivize good lawyering without leading to 
ridiculous discrepancies between plaintiff awards and attorney 
fees. The appropriate factors to determine post-lodestar ad-
justments, as well as the limitations on such adjustments, are 
again best suited for local Chinese governing bodies who can 
properly balance the need for enforcement in employee rights 
claims with the resulting economic and municipal liability con-
cerns associated with such reforms. Furthermore, these organi-
zations are best suited to quickly realize if the increased judi-
cial discretion in awarding post-lodestar fee enhancements 
needs further limitation to achieve its purpose of creating a fi-
nancial incentive for attorneys, without granting excessive and 
undeserved fee awards. 
b. Enhanced Notification 
The modified fee-shifting system proposed above will provide 
a necessary tool for Chinese laborers to access their employ-
ment rights under the Labor Contract Law of 2008 and the 
subsequent amendments. However, despite the strong financial 
motivation this new market of LCL claims will provide for at-
torneys, the system will not succeed without employees actual-
ly understanding their labor and employment rights. 
A majority of Chinese workers learn of their employment 
rights through conventional media sources, such as television 
or the Internet. However, older, poorer, and less educated 
workers have extremely limited access to these resources.175 
The resulting effect is that the most vulnerable populations of 
                                                                                                                            
 173. See Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than Going to 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at C1 (addressing the appeal of settlement 
and estimating that 80–92% of cases never actually reach the trial phase of 
litigation). 
 174. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 556 (2010).  
 175. BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 16. 
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workers, migrant and dispatch laborers, are the least likely to 
obtain reliable information concerning their rights as work-
ers.176 Therefore, to compliment the fee-shifting model and se-
cure knowledge of employment rights, additional regulations 
mandating notification of LCL rights in the workplace must be 
implemented. As seen in many federal and state statutes in the 
United States, poster notifications are used to ensure workers 
obtain knowledge of some of their most basic rights.177 For ex-
ample, under 29 C.F.R. § 1903.2, employers in the United 
States are required to display posters developed by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration.178  The posters are 
required to be placed in “a conspicuous place where workers 
can see it” and specifically inform workers of their rights under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act.179 Similarly, under 
New York Labor Law § 661, New York State employers are re-
quired to post displays informing workers of the current New 
York State minimum wage, overtime rates, and other wage re-
quirements in multiple languages.180 
China should adopt a similar poster-requirement system that 
notifies workers of basic, fundamental employment rights, such 
as the requirements of fixed and open-ended contracts, over-
time pay, and severance pay. The poster requirement must 
mandate placement in a conspicuous location where it can easi-
ly be seen by workers and should be written in both Simplified 
and Traditional Chinese characters181 to ensure that a majority 
of workers have notice of their employment rights. While em-
                                                                                                                            
 176. See id. at 8. 
 177. See, e.g., Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small Busi-
nesses and Other Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster/matrix.htm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2014). 
 178. OSHA’s Workplace Poster: Job Safety and Health: It’s the Law, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (2013), 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/poster.html. 
 179. Id. 
 180. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 661 (McKinney 2010). 
 181. Simplified Chinese vs Traditional Chinese, ELANEX, 
http://www.elanex.com/EN/languages_chinese.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 
2014) (noting that traditional written Chinese holds greater popularity in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and among many Chinese peoples spread throughout 
the world, while simplified Chinese is more popular throughout Mainland 
China and Singapore). 
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ployers may not actively comply with these regulations, as seen 
with those regulations currently in place, the new market for 
labor attorneys will have lawyers actively seeking out these 
easily identifiable and provable violations of the LCL. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the implementation of the Labor Law of 1995, the 
Labor Contract Law of 2008, and the 2013 Amendments to the 
Labor Contract Law, Chinese workers still lack adequate ac-
cess to their employment rights. While these regulations seem 
to reflect a nationwide policy in favor of employee rights, a so-
lution to the enforcement problem will not be found in procur-
ing more restrictive employment regulations. Rather, through 
the use of a modified attorney fee-shifting system and a poster 
notification requirement, China can provide workers with the 
means to access these statutory rights. By using the American 
fee-shifting system in civil rights cases as a model, including 
adjustments to limit unreasonable costs, China can incentivize 
attorneys to seek out employee-rights cases and provide legal 
representation at no charge. Furthermore, by utilizing a poster 
notification system of employment rights, China can combat 
the confusion among workers concerning their statutory rights 
and fuel the employee rights litigation market. With these mi-
nor legislative adjustments, China can complement its already 
progressive employment regulations with the means for work-
ers to access their legal rights. 
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“TWO HOUSEHOLDS, BOTH ALIKE IN 
DIGNITY”: THE INTERNATIONAL FEUD 
BETWEEN ADMIRALTY AND 
BANKRUPTCY 
Two households, both alike in dignity, 
In fair Verona, where we lay our scene, 
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny, 
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean. 
From forth the fatal loins of these two foes 
A pair of star-cross’d lovers take their life; 
Whose misadventured piteous overthrows 
Do with their death bury their parents’ strife. 
The fearful passage of their death-mark’d love, 
And the continuance of their parents’ rage, 
Which, but their children’s end, nought could remove, 
Is now the two hours’ traffic of our stage; 
The which if you with patient ears attend, 
What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.1 
INTRODUCTION 
n 2012, the Japanese shipping firm Sanko Steamship Co. 
(“Sanko”) unilaterally refused to make lease payments on 
certain of its commercial shipping vessels.2 After Sanko 
stopped making its payments, multiple creditors, including the 
Liberian navigation firm Evridiki Navigation, Inc. (“Evridiki”), 
proceeded quasi in rem3 against the M/V Sanko Mineral (“the 
Mineral”) and attached the vessel while it was in port at Bal-
timore, Maryland.4 Sanko refused to post a bond, which would 
have released the Mineral, out of concern that such action 
would affect its private resolution process with its chief credi-
tors.5 The vessel, however, still contained cargo for which 
Sanko’s customers had already paid.6 Several of these custom-
ers, some incorporated abroad and others in the United States, 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, prologue. 
 2. Evridiki Navigation, Inc. v. Sanko S.S. Co., 880 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668 
(D. Md. 2012). 
 3. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 4. Evridiki, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 668. 
 5. In furtherance of its efforts to avoid a formal bankruptcy filing, Sanko 
had started a private resolution process with its chief creditors. Id. at 669. 
 6. Id. at 668. 
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